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Corporate governance has become an important topic in transition economies in recent years. Directors, owners 
and corporate managers have started to realize that there are benefits that can accrue from having a good 
corporate governance structure. Good corporate governance helps to increase share price and makes it easier to 
obtain capital. International investors are hesitant to lend money or buy shares in a corporation that does not 
subscribe to good corporate governance principles. Transparency, independent directors and a separate audit 
committee are especially important. Some international investors will not seriously consider investing in 
accompany that does not have these things. Several organizations have popped up in recent years to help adopt 
and implement good corporate governance principles. This Research paper begins with an overview of some 
basic corporate governance mechanism  the regulation and enforcement relies on the development of an inter-
related web of public and private institutions, regulations and rights that underpin the four basic values of 
corporate governance – transparency, accountability, fairness, and responsibility. Without the guarantee of these 
institutions, the market-building benefits of good internal corporate governance become tenuous. However, if 
functioning well, their benefits have far-reaching impact, increasing investor confidence and providing business 
the legal basis needed to take risk and to grow. 
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1.Introduction 
Governance is about accountability and responsibility where Corporate governance is about the structures and 
processes for the direction and control of companies as concerning the relationships among the management, 
board of directors, controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance 
is an important aspect of business and many researches shows that, good corporate governance can ensures the 
success of a business and reduces inefficiencies and risks to its emerging market. So, The Policies on corporate 
governance should promote creation of sustainable value throughout the economic system. However different 
types of modern models of corporate governance applied since 1776, but the world faced financial crisis many 
times and one of those is the global financial crisis of mortgage market was in 2008. Now the world leaders are 
to enact some laws, which increase corporate governance and bank governance. Currently all over the world has 
increased concern over corporate governance due to the increase of reported cases of frauds, inside trading, 
agency conflicts among other corporations. Corporate governance based on strong principals and regulations 
helps to establish the roles and responsibilities of the key members of the corporation. Good corporate 
governance allows the corporation to work smoothly due to the existence of a clear level of accountability and 
communication amongst the organization, as well as people understanding what their roles and responsibilities 
are, and might ensure eligibility for supplemental resources, allocating and directing them to make sustained and 
sustainable progress towards the corporation’s defined purpose. Policymakers and regulators, in particular, 
should seek to ensure that the governance of an organization reflects its wider role in economies and society. In 
recent, the economic growth rate of Bangladesh is increasing goodly both institutional and market based but 
some incidents have already happened in Bangladesh that has created a negative image in the mind of the 
stockholders as well as corporations due to have some major negative issues which are playing roles within the 
corporate governance considered as some ineffective elements of the Bengali culture of corporate governance 
which can lead us to a recession in farther economic condition. The specific issues like corporate governance 
structure is dominated by family members, Inadequate Bankruptcy Laws are another problem and  in terms of 
provisions it is not enough strong about enforcement. In some of the sectors, governances are considering weak 
regulatory system along with board interference with the management system. There are also problems in 
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Shareholder’s activism, Lack of auditor’s independence, practicing poor auditing and financial reports are rarely 
reliable and free from the control of the governance. Free enterprise without regulation may or may not be the 
best way to create lasting value in today’s world. The South African King III Code, issued in 2009, says that 
‘good governance is essentially about effective leadership. Such leadership is characterised by the ethical value 
of responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency. Responsible leaders direct the company strategies 
and operations with a view to achieving sustainable economic, social and environmental performance’. 
 
2. Statement of the Problem 
The problem statement of this research is ― To investigate the mechanism of corporate governance, due to the 
in-depth interrelationship between the board composition, management system and ownership which has a huge 
impact on Individual Corporation’s overall performance resulting in the Earning Per Share (EPS).  
 
3. Purpose of the Study  
 To properly understand the corporate governance. 
 Analyzing different obligations of different forms of corporate governance. 
 Identifying the major changes in corporate governances through decades. 
 Exploring the effect of different types of corporate governance. 
 Evaluating the mechanism of corporate governances to differentiate the reasons behind the 
recommendation problems. 
 Determining most important principles and impacts on shareholders. 
 Come out with some significant opportunities or scope to consider an ideal mechanism. 
 
4. Literature Review  
4.1 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance refers to the structures and processes for the direction and control of companies. 
Corporate governance concerns the relationships among the management, Board of Directors, controlling 
shareholders, minority shareholders and other stakeholders. Good corporate governance contributes to 
sustainable economic development by enhancing the performance of companies and increasing their access to 
outside capital.  
Corporate governance is defined as the structures and processes by which companies are directed and 
controlled. Good corporate governance helps companies operate more efficiently, improve access to capital, 
mitigate risk and safeguard against mismanagement. It makes companies more accountable and transparent to 
investors and gives them the tools to respond to stakeholder concerns. Corporate governance also contributes to 
development. Increased access to capital encourages new investments, boosts economic growth, and provides 
employment opportunities.  
IFC works with firms to attract and retain investment by promoting the adoption of good corporate 
governance practices and standards.IFC is building on its successful track record with the aim of delivering 
targeted corporate governance support to more clients and stakeholders for even better results by: 
1. Assessing a firm’s corporate governance practices and providing advice on how to improve them; 
2. Providing specialized advisory services on board effectiveness, the control environment and family 
business governance; 
3. Building capacity of local partners, institutes of directors, media, and educational institutions on 
corporate governance services, training and reporting; 
4. Working with regulatory institutions and governments to improve corporate governance laws, 
regulations, codes and listing requirements; and 
5. Raising awareness of corporate governance through conferences, workshops and publications. 
IFC’s Corporate Governance Methodology is a system of evaluating corporate governance risks and 
opportunities of client companies, applying the relevant set of tools in the areas of commitment to good 
corporate governance practices, shareholder rights, accountability and the board of directors, the control 
environment, and disclosure and transparency.IFC is the first development finance institution to require 
corporate governance analysis of every investment transaction as part of its due diligence process. Since July 1, 
2011, all new IFC investments have been subject to a focused corporate governance analysis during the appraisal 
process.  This Methodology has been distilled into a unified set of tools known as the Corporate Governance 
Development Framework. The Framework has been adopted by 31 development finance institutions, including 
IFC, thus far. Signatory institutions cover emerging markets around the world. The Framework will help 
development finance institutions assess the quality of corporate governance at the companies in which they 
invest. Signatories to the Framework aim to raise awareness of the importance of good governance to sustainable 
economic development, both at the private and public sector levels. By adopting a unified approach, the 
development finance institutions will set consistent standards for corporate governance due diligence and 
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advance the business case for good corporate governance. (Corporate Governance – ifc.org) 
 
4.2 Board Composition 
Board composition generally refer to issues connect to board independence, diversity (firm and industry 
experience, functional backgrounds, etc) of board members, and CEO duality. In board composition has included 
size of the board, business relationships with directors and executive officers, board membership criteria, 
directors with a material change in status, retirement policy, board compensation and many more. There is highly 
effective boards include a mix of directors with the expertise and experience to fulfill their essential oversight 
roles. Directors’ responsibilities are expanding, and the number and complexity of the issues they have to 
oversee are increasing.In general, directors can be classified into three categories. Insider directors or 
management directors are salaried employees, such as the CEO, president, CFO or COO. Related or affiliated 
outside directors are those who have a pre-existing relationship with the firm, such as family relatives and retired 
executives. Independent outside directors are directors who have no personal connections or business dealing 
with the firm. Board independence refers to a corporate board that has a majority of independent outside 
directors. Compared to an insider-dominated board, an outsider-dominated board is believed to be more vigilant 
in monitoring managerial behaviors and decision-making of the firm. By the laws the Board of Directors may 
determine the size of the Board from time to time, and that the Nominating and Governance Committee may 
recommend to the Board changes in the size of the Board. There have some principles that are following in 
board composition. These are size of the Board should generally have no fewer than 10 nor more than 14 
directors, The number of directors at any time will depend upon several factors, including (a) resignations, 
retirements, and the availability of appropriate, qualified candidates; (b) assuring that the Board has a small 
enough number to facilitate active discussions and decision-making; and (c) assuring that the Board has a 
sufficient number of directors to fulfill committee assignments and to provide the appropriate mix of continuity 
(timewarner.com). (SushilTamang on academia.com) tried to focus on that examine how well the board 
composition plays role in effective CG issues and practices as well as give some objectives like that  
1. To examine two of the board diversity attributes (gender, age) and the board independence of top 12 
Nepalese organizations. 
2. To define the board composition importance and the associated factors influencing in the effectiveness 
of CG. 
3. To show the relationship between the effect of board composition in regulating the CG framework. 
4. To give a space for the extended research opportunities in the similar field of investigation for further 
study. 
However, having an independent board alone may not be sufficient to guarantee good governance 
control. It is likely that some independent board members might be brought in to serve as tokens or window 
dressing in order to fulfill the minimum regulatory requirements. Moreover, outside directors might not be truly 
independent from firm executives if they feel indebted to the CEO who hired them or have developed strong 
friendship with the top management at the focal firm over the years they have served on the board. In addition, a 
board that consists of directors with a diverse set of functional expertise (marketing, engineering, finance, etc) 
industry experiences, educational qualifications, ethnic and gender mix might be better equipped to deal with a 
wide range of issues facing the firm and provide executives with advice and consultation from multiple 
perspectives. 
 
4.3 Board of Directors 
Board of Director is a group of director elected by the shareholders to run a company.  In details it is an 
appointed or elected body or committee that has overall responsibility for the management of a nonprofit or non-
stock organization, such as a foundation, university or mutual fund. A group of individuals that are elected as, or 
elected to act as, representatives of the stockholders to establish corporate management related policies and to 
make decisions on major company issues. Such issues include the hiring/firing of executives, dividend policies, 
options policies and executive compensation. Every public company must have a board of directors. In general, 
the board makes decisions on shareholders' behalf. Most importantly, the board of directors should be a fair 
representation of both management and shareholders' interests; too many insiders serving as directors will mean 
that the board will tend to make decisions more beneficial to management. On the other hand, possessing too 
many independent directors may mean management will be left out of the decision-making process and may 
cause good managers to leave in frustration. (www.investopedia.com/terms/b/boardofdirectors.asp) 
A company's board of directors provides the company with direction and advice. It is their 
responsibility to ensure that the company fulfills its mission statement and in doing so, it will frequently set the 
company's overall policy objectives. For these reasons, a good board of directors includes knowledgeable and 
experienced business people. Typically, only one member of the board is involved with the day-to-day activities 
of the company. This person is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and he or she acts as a liaison between the 
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board of directors and the rest of the company. The CEO is responsible for communicating to the board the daily 
status of the company, and for communicating and implementing the vision and policy objectives. A well 
functioning board acts as a top level advisor to the company. The entrepreneurs who start a company usually 
provide the initial vision and mission statement, and board subsequently gives advice on how to best implement 
this vision. A good board of directors will also let the company know when it is drifting away from its goals and 
objectives. More and more, the board will be held fiscally responsible for the performance of the company. It is 
still rare for board members to be sued because of something the company has or hasn't done, but it can happen, 
and damages have been awarded against some members, including those who have allowed a company to drift 
into bankruptcy by way of their own negligence. (www.wisegeek.com/what-does-a-board-of-directors-do.htm) 
Members of the board are usually compensated for their position. Compensation is usually in terms of 
perks and share certificates or options. In this way, members' interests are aligned with the shareholders' interests. 
Board positions usually are not salaried. Charitable organizations frequently also use a board of directors, and in 
such cases, the only compensation is usually some perks and the recognition and prestige that comes with being 
an important part of a significant charitable organization. To be eligible as a board member of a publicly traded 
company, you must be over 18 and have a clean criminal record. There are no restrictions prohibiting family 
members from being on the board of directors, but this is generally not advised. Those that include family 
members tend to be viewed suspiciously, and a strong board can be a very valuable asset for the company, 
particularly when trying to raise capital. Mention the phrase "board of directors" to the average investor, and 
they are likely to conjure up images of nicely dressed men and women standing around a mahogany table, 
smiling congenially. This is entirely understandable; many annual reports prominently feature glossy 
photographs of just such a scene. Now, ask the investor to describe the primary responsibility of the board of 
directors and very few will be able to give you a definitive answer. The primary responsibility of the board of 
directors is to protect the shareholders' assets and ensure they receive a decent return on their investment. In 
some European countries, the sentiment is much different; many directors there feel that it is their primary 
responsibility to protect the employees of a company first, the shareholders second. In these social and political 
climates, corporate profitability takes a back seat the needs of workers. The board of directors is the highest 
governing authority within the management structure at any publicly traded company. It is the board's job to 
select, evaluate, and approve appropriate compensation for the company's chief executive officer (CEO), 
evaluate the attractiveness of and pay dividends, recommend stock splits, oversee share repurchase programs, 




The Management Board and the Supervisory Board view on corporate governance as an inclusive concept for 
responsible, transparent and value-ledcorporate management. Good corporate governance promotes trust in our 
entity amongnational and international investors, the financial markets, business partners, employees and the 
public. The Management Board, the Supervisory Board and the management ensurethat corporate governance is 
actively implemented and continuously developed throughout the entity. Corporate governance at Infineon 
encompasses not only the German Corporate Governance Code (Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex - 
"DCGK"), but also the standards of the internal control system, compliance - especially the Infineon 
BusinessConduct Guidelines - and regulations on organizational and supervisory duties within the entity, which 
are available to all employees on the Infineon intranet. There is a role that is typically ascribed to directors is 
control of the process by which top executives are hired, promoted, assessed, and, if necessary, dismissed (see, 
e.g., Vancil, 1987, for a descriptive analysis and Naveen, 2006, for statistical evidence). Assessment can be seen 
as having two components, one is monitoring of what top management does and the other is determining the 
intrinsic ability of top management. The monitoring of managerial actions can, in part, be seen as part of a 
board’s obligation to be vigilant against managerial malfeasance. Yet, being realistic, it is difficult to see a board 
actually being in a position to detect managerial malfeasance directly; at best, a board would seem dependent on 
the actions of outside auditors, regulators, and, in some instances, the news media. Indirectly, a board might 
guard against managerial malfeasance through its choice of auditor, its oversight over reporting requirements, 
and its control over accounting practices. The Management Board considers the systematic and effective 
management of risks and opportunities as part of good corporate governance and one of our key success factors. 
It forms a part of our business operations and ensures that risks and opportunities are detected early and exposure 
to risk is minimized. This transparency of the risk exposure group-wide also makes a contribution to the 
systematic and continuous increase in the value of the Company. One of the most common occupations of 
outside directors is CEO of another firm. CEOs of other firms clearly have management skills and an 
understanding of the issues facing top management. Fahlenbrach et al. (2008) consider the effect of having CEO 
directors on boards. These authors find no evidence, however, that CEOs on boards add value, at least relative to 
other outside directors. This conclusion is somewhat at odds with Fich (2005), discussed in detail later, which 
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finds the announcement that CEOs of well-performing firms will be added to the board generates positive 
abnormal returns. 
 
4.5 Equity Ownership 
Ownership is a situation where a business is owned by the employees who work in it. The ultimate and exclusive 
right conferred by a lawful claim or title, and subject to certain restrictions to enjoy, occupy, possess, rent, sell, 
use, give away, or even destroy an item of property. Ownership may be corporeal (title to a tangible object such 
as a house) or incorporeal (title to an intangible object, such as a copyright, or a right to recover debt). 
Possession (as in tenancy) does not necessarily mean ownership because it does not automatically transfer title. 
(www.businessdictionary.com/definition/ownership.html#ixzz3Gn6cFgqk). In (SanjaiBhagatPaper) propose 
corporate board ownership as a new measure of corporate governance, and find this measure more appropriate 
than measures used in the extant literature including those suggested by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (GIM, 2003) 
and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (BCF, 2004). The studies use IRRC data, Brown and Caylor (2004) use 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) data to create their governance index. This index considers 52 corporate 
governance features such as board structure and processes, corporate charter issues such as poison pills, 
management and director compensation and stock ownership. There is a related strand of the literature that 
considers corporate board characteristics as important determinants of corporate governance: board 
independence (see Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003)), stock ownership of board members (see Bhagat, 
Carey, and Elson (1999). The governance mechanisms that have been most extensively studied in the U.S. can 
be broadly characterized as being either internal or external to the firm. The internal mechanisms of primary 
interest are the board of directors and the equity ownership structure of the firm. Ownership and control are 
rarely completely separated within any firm. The controllers frequently have some degree of ownership of the 
equity of the firms they control; while some owners, by virtue of the size of their equity positions, effectively 
have some control over the firms they own. Thus, ownership structure (i.e., the identities of a firm's equity 
holders and the sizes of their positions) is a potentially important element of corporate governance. Early 
corporate governance research in the U.S. centered on the idea that corporations are owned by widely dispersed 
shareholders and are controlled by professional managers who own little or none of the equity of the firms they 
man- age. Beginning in the late 1980s, however, research emerged that recognized that many U.S. corporations 
do, in fact, have significant equity ownership by insiders or shareholders that own significant blocks of equity. 
Holderness (2003) surveys the U.S. evidence on equity ownership by insiders and block holders, where insiders 
are defined as the officers and directors of a firm and a block holder is any entity that owns at least 5% of the 
firm's equity. He reports that average inside ownership in publicly traded U.S. corporations is approximately 
20%, varying from almost none in some firms to majority ownership by insiders in others. Mehran (1995) 
reports that 56% of the firms in a sample of randomly selected manufacturing firms have outside block holders. 
 
4.6 Board composition and Corporate Governance 
Board composition normally concerns issues related to board independence (including independence of board 
committees), diversity of board members, and CEO duality. Internal corporate governance is concentrated with 
the relationship between management and shareholder, or between corporate insiders and outsiders shareholders. 
Institutional, legal and contractual agreement of the internal corporate governance system includes the rights of 
shareholders and their protection, board of director’s role and responsibility. According to (academia.edu) Board 
diversity can be defined as variety in the composition of the Board of Directors. These are two categories of 
diversity: observable diversity, which is readily detectable attributes of directors, and less visible diversity, such 
as background of diversity (Milliken & Martins, 1996). Observable diversity includes race/ethnic background, 
nationality, gender and age, while less visible diversity comprises educational, functional and occupational 
backgrounds, industry experience, and organizational membership. Some of the advantages of board diversity 
include promotion of a better understanding of the market place increased creativity and innovation, and 
effective problem solving (Carter, Simkins& Simpson, 2003). The idea that the BOD of any corporation should 
predominantly comprise outside directors, with a presumed independence from management, is not new. For 
example, (Chandler, 1975) argued more than 30 years ago that: “. . . it is almost ridiculous to have to justify the 
importance of a strong majority of outside directors. If it is true that the board must steadfastly represent the 
stockholders in making a continuous evaluation of the CEO’s performance, then a board of predominately (even 
overwhelmingly) outsiders logically follows.” The idea that the chairperson of the board should be an 
independent director has gained much support as an internal governance mechanism to ensure the overall 
independence of the board (Beasley, 1996). An independent director should not have any relationships with the 
corporations or its management- whether business, employment, charitable or personal- that may impair, or 
appear to impair, the director’s ability to exercise independent judgment. Whatever leadership structures a board 
chooses, independent board leadership is critical to effective corporate governance. Board independence is 
critical to effective corporate governance. Adherence to good Corporate Governance practice will help to 
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improve the confidence of domestic investors, reduce the cost of capital and ultimately induce more stable 
source of financing (Carla, Tarek, Chong & Brian, 2005). 
 
4.7 Board of Directors and Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance guidelines and the document of the committees of the Board of Directors of the Company 
have been approved by the Board of Directors and provide the framework for the corporate governance of the 
Company. (company.ingersollrand.com/.../corporate-governance/corporate-governance). The Company’s 
business is managed under the direction of the Board of Directors. The Board delegates to the Chief Executive 
Officer, and through that individual to other senior management, the authority and responsibility for managing 
the Company’s business. The Board’s role is to oversee the management and governance of the Company and to 
monitor senior management’s performance. By selecting individuals for Board membership and evaluate the 
performance of the Board, Board committees and individual directors is a core responsibility of boards. Another 
responsibility is like select, monitor, evaluate and compensate senior management as well as monitoring 
corporate performance and evaluate results compared to the strategic plans and other long-range goals. On the 
(code of corporate governance for Bangladesh.www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code.) Board of directors is 
including elements of corporate governance which is very important and on Bangladesh perspective AGMs 
should provide an opportunity for some discussion of substance and allow for the shareholders to assert their 
rights regarding the agenda items they are asked to approve. There are, limits to the ability of a large meeting of 
diverse shareholders to provide specific feedback to the board, but the format of the meeting should establish the 
fact that the Board of Directors is accountable to the shareholders and those important items for shareholder 
consideration should be explained clearly.The Board of Directors should present a balanced assessment of the 
company’s position and prospects that may be understood by shareholders (code of corporate governance. 
Disclosure Principles. A). Effective governance requires boards to focus on three major areas of responsibility: 
(1) management accountability, (2) strategic planning and policy-making, and (3) self regulation. These three 
areas allow the board to fulfill its fiduciary obligations.Corporate governance by definition rests with the conduct 
of the board of directors, who are chosen on behalf of the shareholders. (Corporate Governance Forum of Japan 
1997).  Corporate governance is the relationship between corporate managers, board of directors and the 
providers of equity, people and institutions who save and invest their capital to earn a return. It ensures that the 
board of directors is accountable for the pursuit of corporate objectives and that the corporation itself conforms 
to the law and regulations (International Chamber of Commerce). According to (NACD) corporate boards of 
directors are responsible for certain decisions on behalf of the corporation. At a minimum, as stated in most state 
statutes of incorporation, director approval is usually required for amending corporation bylaws, issuing shares, 
or declaring dividends. Also, the board alone can recommend that shareholders vote to amend articles of 
incorporation, dissolve the corporation, or sell the corporation. No other person or entity except the board can 
take these actions. That is why discussions of “corporate governance” often focus on boards. 
 
4.8 Management and Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance system is the combination of mechanisms which ensure that the management (the agent) 
runs the firm for the benefit of one or several stakeholders (principals). Such stakeholders may cover 
shareholders, creditors, suppliers, clients, employees and other parties with whom the firm conducts its business. 
(Goergen and Renneboog, 2006). Corporate governance is a field in economics that investigates how to 
secure/motivate efficient management of corporations by the use of incentive mechanisms, such as contracts, 
organizational designs and legislation. This is often limited to the question of improving financial performance, 
for example, how the corporate owners can secure/motivate that the corporate managers will deliver a 
competitive rate of return. (Mathiesen, 2002).  According to (Monks and Minow, Corporate Governance, from 
1995 version) corporate governance is the relationship management in determining the direction and 
performance of corporations. (American Management Association) says that corporate governance is about how 
suppliers of capital get managers to return profits, make sure managers do not misuse the capital by investing in 
bad projects, and how shareholders and creditors monitor managers. The positive effect of management 
capabilities on financial leverage is explained by the managers’ expertise that gives them the incentive to 
increase the company’s indebtedness on the condition of a proper risk management strategy of the company; a 
manager with a certain qualification is in the position to benefit from the positive effect of financial leverage. By 
the (chief executive officer and the board of directors. – CalPERS) Corporate governance is the relationship 
among various participants in determining the direction and performance of corporations. The primary 
participants are: shareholders; company management. The corporatist compromise made much of managers and 
workers “being in the ‘same boat’ together, of corporate governance choices that ensured that firms ‘served the 
nation’ in a ‘stable’ economy – with owners dismissed as oligarchs or ‘speculators.' Corporate governance is the 
system by which companies are directed and managed. It influences how the objectives of the company are set 
and achieved, how risk is monitored and assessed, and how performance is optimized. Good corporate 
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governance structures encourage companies to create value (through entrepreneurism, innovation, development 
and exploration) and provide accountability and control systems commensurate with the risks involved. (ASX 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practices Recommendations, 2003). 
 
4.9 Ownership and Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance can influence a firm’s performance whenever a conflict of interest arises between 
management and shareholders and/or between controlling and minority shareholders. Corporate governance is 
about “the whole set of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that determine what public corporations 
can do, who controls them, how that control is exercised, and how the risks and return from the activities they 
undertake are allocated.”  (Margaret Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the 
Twenty-First Century, 1995). The ability to fulfill these goals is conditioned on the power insiders have in the 
company’s decision-making process. Managers will enjoy more power as they are part of the board or act in 
connivance with the board and the controlling shareholders. In turn, the power of controlling shareholders relies 
in how effectively they can manipulate board decisions by way of voting majorities and other means; 
distortionary policies will then increase as the ratio of voting to cash flow rights is higher (La Porta et al., 1999, 
and Claessens et al., 1999). Outsiders have two main instruments to counterbalance this power: the enforcement 
of adequate corporate governance standards and the quality of the regulatory and legal environment. A wedge 
between control and cash flow rights is likely to harm minority shareholders and corporate valuation, (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976 and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988) make the point that concentrated ownership may 
actually have an ambiguous effect: on one hand, there may be a beneficial effect on performance and valuation 
(the so-called “incentive effect”) in that higher cash flows rights in the hands of a few shareholders tends to 
reduce the free riding problem associated with dispersed ownership when it comes to monitoring and punishing 
opportunistic managers; on the other hand, the negative effect. International evidence has greatly increased in the 
last few years.  
 
5. Conceptual Framework 
 
 
6. Questions and Hypotheses 
6.1 Research Questions: 
Q.1: Does the board composition plays an important role in corporate governance mechanism? 
Q.2: Does the board of directors delivers their potential effort to the governance mechanism?  
Q.3: How does the management affected by the venture capitalist of the organization? 
Q.4: Does the Corporate Governance’s policies satisfy the stock holders?  
 
6.2 Hypothesis: 
Ho1: Board composition does not play an important role in corporate governance mechanism. 
Ha1: Board composition plays an important role in corporate governance mechanism. 
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Ho2: Board of directors does not deliver their potential effort to the governance mechanism.  
Ha2: Board of directors delivers their potential effort to the governance mechanism. 
 
Ho3: The management does not affected by the venture capitalist of the organization. 
Ha3: The management affected by the venture capitalist of the organization. 
 
Ho4: Corporate Governance’s policy does not satisfy the stock holders. 
Ha4: Corporate Governance’s policies satisfy the stock holders. 
 
7 The Research Design – Methods and Procedures    
Research design is the blueprint for the collection, measurement and analysis of data. In this study, we have 
selected formal research study. Because this study required structured and precised way to show the relationship 
among different variables and to test hypotheses.  
 
7.1 Degree of Research Question Crystallization 
Formal Study: Our research is formal study research, because it begins with a hypotheses and research 
questions and involves precise procedures. Our research goal is to test the hypotheses, for these reason our 
research is formal study research.   
 
7.2 Method of Data Collection 
Communication: Under the method of data collection, we selected communication study. Because we needed to 
communicate with different employees through questionnaire by considering their recommendation for  the 
desired corporate governance, which have significant impact on individual organizations performance.  
 
7.3 Researcher Control of Variables 
Experiment: In the experiment research, researcher can control and/or manipulate the variables. In our research 
we can also control or manipulate our independent variables. That’s why our research is experiment research.    
 
7.4 The Purpose of the Study 
Causal Research: Our research is causal research. Because we will try to find out how independent variables 
will change dependent variable.  
 
7.5 The Time Dimension 
Cross-Sectional: Our research will be carried out once and will be represent a snapshot of one point of time. 
 
7.6 The Topical Scope 
Statistical Study: Statistical studies are designed for breadth rather than depth. In our research we will also try 
to find out the breadth of Corporate governance mechanism. We attempted to capture a population’s 
characteristics by making inferences from a sample’s characteristics. And our hypothesis will be tested by 
quantitatively. At the end we will generalize our findings. 
 
7.7 The Research Environment 
Field Conditions: In our research the research environment is field condition research. Our research will be 
under the natural environment to the real customers with the real data.  
 
7.8 The Participant’s Perception of Research Activity 
Actual Routine: Under the participants’ perception our research is actual routine based research, because 
through our research participants perception will not be deviated from everyday routine.        
Participants ‘were aware of our presence and knew the reason of being selected as sample. We tried to find out 
real statements as much as we could via our questionnaires. 
 
8.Sampling 
8.1 Sample unit 
Sample unit of research was based on clients who were in different companies and industries. In order to gather 
information, participants had been asked to fill up questionnaires. To work on this category, we had to know 
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8.2 Sample Size 
It relates the number of people and their attributes to pick for the study. We choose employees from 20 different 
organizations, both male and female of different ages (25 to 40+), educational back ground and occupation. We 
constructed 20 sets of questionnaire. In each set has total 20 questions for 5 Variables.  
 
8.3 Sample Procedure 
Sample procedure is the technique of sampling for data collection. We constructed our sample unit and size 
based on our subject and target participants. In this case, firstly, we had to select some organizations. Secondly, 
and we have to involve in selecting participants randomly for questionnaires and tried to pursue them to collect 
the reliable data. 
 
9.Instruments Design of Research 
Due to the nature of the wide variety of data collection methods, the process of data collection will vary from 
project to project. In this step the procedures are subjected to the data collection instrument or collection method 
dictated through these plan. 
Measurement Scale: We have used a ‘Five Point Likert Scale’ in our questionnaire. Every variable has different 
questions for each and our questionnaire introduces five points Likert scale to our participations. 
Communication approach: In our questionnaire, questions have been asked about for each of the variables in 
such a manner with requires up to go to do an Survey. 
Structure: Our questions are structured because we have been arranged according to the variable. 
Disguised/ Undisguised and Funnel approach: 
In our questionnaire, we have started our questions disguisedly but we also had to construct some disguised 
questions through funnel approach to get the desired information. 
 
10.Data collection  
Data collection is one of the most important stages to conduct a research which determines two methods known 
as Qualitative and Quantitative methods. 
 
Methods: Though verifying the Hypothesis, Quantitative method is required. But to research on Corporate 
Governance mechanism we consider both of the methods as Mixed Methods to achieve both the depth and 
breadth that qualitative and quantitative methods together Mixed methods to encompass multifaceted approaches 
that combine to capitalize on strengths and reduce weaknesses that stem from using a single research design. 
 
Sources of Data:  
Secondary data  
Data obtained from secondary sources such as reports, journals, documents, the web and more. 
 
Primary data  
Data collected through observation or questionnaire survey in a natural setting from the original source in a 
controlled or an uncontrolled environment. 
We consider both of the Secondary data Primary data to increase the validity and reliability of our research. 
 
11. Data Analysis 
Through the Survey after collecting all the required data for each variable we used those values to analysis by 
inserting all data in SPSS for testing the Hypothesis in four steps. 
• Descriptive Analysis 
• Reliability Analysis 
• Hypotheses Analysis 
• Regression Analysis 
 
11.1  Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive statistics can be used to summarize the data. Measures of frequency and crosstabs were used to 
evaluate the biographical information and the distribution of age and sex across the different income groups. 
Personal and demographic information such as gender, age, income are in the following tables. 
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Table # 1 : Gender Frequency 
Sex 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Male 16 80.0 80.0 80.0 
Female 4 20.0 20.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
According to table 1 it shows 80% was male and 20% was female. 
 
Table # 2: Age Frequency 
Age 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 26-30 1 5.0 5.0 5.0 
31-35 5 25.0 25.0 30.0 
36-40 6 30.0 30.0 60.0 
45 ad above 8 40.0 40.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
According to table 2 it shows the ages; 5% is between 26-30, 25% is between 31-3,  
30% is between 36-40 and 40% is 45 and above. 
 
Table # 3 : Education Frequency 
Education 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid BA 3 15.0 15.0 15.0 
MAST 16 80.0 80.0 95.0 
PhD 1 5.0 5.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0  
 
According to table 3 it shows the Educational level which are; 15% people have done BA,  
80% have done MAST and 5% have done PhD. 
11.2 Reliability Analysis 
This measures the overall consistency of the items that are used to define a scale. As a result, we are given 
sample size, number of items and reliability coefficients.  Model- Alpha (Cronbach) is the most popular and use 
this to get the valid information. 
 
 Cronbach Alpha value should be between 0.5-0.6 which is sufficient; 0.7 and above is desirable. 
 α ≥ 0.9   Excellent  
 0.7 ≤ α < 0.9  Good  
 0.6 ≤ α < 0.7 Acceptable  
 0.5 ≤ α < 0.6 Poor  
 α < 0.5   Unacceptable 
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Table 4: Reliability Statistics: Board  Composition 
 
Case Processing Summary 
  N % 
Cases Valid 20 100.0 
Excluded
a
 0 .0 
Total 20 100.0 




Reliability Statistics : Board  Composition 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.720 4 
Cronbach alpha .72 (0.7 ≤ α < 0.9) it means Good 
also it is desirable and highly reliable variable.  And it 
states that the Alternate hypotheses (Ha) is accepted 
and Null hypotheses (Ho) is rejected. 
 
Table 5: Reliability Statistics : Board of Directors 
 
Case Processing Summary 
  N % 
Cases Valid 20 100.0 
Excluded
a
 0 .0 
Total 20 100.0 





Reliability Statistics : Board of Directors 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.660 4 
Cronbach alpha .660 (0.6 ≤ α < 0.7) Which is 
Acceptable. The reliability is high of this variable. As 
for the value of alpha showing above in the table which 
required to being accept.  And it states that the Alternate 
hypotheses (Ha) is accepted and Null hypotheses (Ho) is 
rejected. 
 
Table 6: Reliability Statistics : Management 
 
Case Processing Summary 
  N % 
Cases Valid 20 100.0 
Excluded
a
 0 .0 
Total 20 100.0 




Reliability Statistics : Management 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.653 4 
Cronbach alpha .653 (0.6 ≤ α < 0.7) Which is 
Acceptable. The reliability is high of this variable. As 
for the value of alpha showing above in the table which 
required to being accept.  And it states that the Alternate 
hypotheses (Ha) is accepted and Null hypotheses (Ho) is 
rejected. 
 
Table 7: Reliability Statistics : Equity Ownership 
 
Case Processing Summary 
  
N % 
Cases Valid 20 100.0 
Excluded
a
 0 .0 
Total 20 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the 
procedure. 
 
Reliability Statistics : Equity Ownership 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.620 4 
Cronbach alpha .620 (0.6 ≤ α < 0.7) Which is 
Acceptable. The reliability is high of this variable. As for 
the value of alpha showing above in the table which 
required to being accept.  And it states that the Alternate 
hypotheses (Ha) is accepted and Null hypotheses (Ho) is 
rejected. 
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Table 8: Reliability Statistics : Corporate Governance 
 
Case Processing Summary 
  N % 
Cases Valid 20 100.0 
Excluded
a
 0 .0 
Total 20 100.0 




Reliability Statistics : Corporate Governance 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.816 4 
Cronbach alpha .816 (0.7 ≤ α < 0.9) it means Good also 
it is desirable and highly reliable variable.  And it states 
that the Alternate hypotheses (Ha) is accepted and Null 
hypotheses (Ho) is rejected. 
 
11.3 Hypothesis Testing (correlation testing) 
The correlational interpretations were done on two types of correlation coefficients.  
• Pearson  
• Spearman  
 
• Pearson Correlation: Shows the relationship btween variables. 
Table 9: Correlations of Board Composition and Corporate Governance 
  Board Composition Corporate Governance 
Board Composition Pearson Correlation 1 .954
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 20 20 
Corporate Governance Pearson Correlation .954
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 20 20 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
The table shows there is a good correlation within the Board Composition and Corporate Governance 
and the correlation value comes up to the .954 with a**significant level at .01.which accept the Alternate 
hypothesis Ha1and reject the Null hypothesis Ho1 
 
Table 10: Correlations of Board of Directors and Corporate Governance 
  Board of Directors Corporate Governance 
Board of Directors Pearson Correlation 1 .722
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 20 20 
Corporate Governance Pearson Correlation .722
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 20 20 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
The table shows there is a good correlation within the Board of Directors and Corporate Governance 
and the correlation value comes up to the .722 with a**significant level at .01.which accept the Alternate 
hypothesis Ha2and reject the Null hypothesis Ho2 
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Table 11:Correlations of Management and Corporate Governance 
  Management Corporate Governance 
Management Pearson Correlation 1 .868
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 20 20 
Corporate Governance Pearson Correlation .868
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 20 20 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
The table shows that there is a good correlation within the Management and Corporate Governance 
and the correlation value comes up to the .868 with a**significant level at .01.which accept the Alternate 
hypothesis Ha3 and reject the Null hypothesis Ho3. 
Table 12: Correlations of Equity Ownership and Corporate Governance 
  Equity Ownership Corporate Governance 
Equity Ownership Pearson Correlation 1 .837
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 20 20 
Corporate Governance Pearson Correlation .837
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 20 20 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
The table shows that there is a good correlation within the Equity Ownership and Corporate 
Governance and the correlation value comes up to the .897 with a**significant level at .01.which accept the 
Alternate hypothesis Ha4 and reject the Null hypothesis Ho4 
• Spearman’s Correlation: Shows the strength of relationship 
 
Table 13: Spearman’s Rho of Board Composition and Corporate Governance 
   Board Composition Corporate Governance 
Spearman's rho Board Composition Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .774
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 20 20 
Corporate Governance Correlation Coefficient .774
**
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 20 20 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
The correlation between Board Composition and Corporate Governance shows .774 with each other at 
a significant level of .01. Hence this shows it has a “very (.60-.79) strong” correlation between the two variables 
as result this alternative hypothesis should be accepted and null hypothesis is rejected.  
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Table 14: Spearman’s Rho of Board of Directors and Corporate Governance 
   Board of Directors Corporate Governance 
Spearman's rho Board of Directors Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .723
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 20 20 
Corporate Governance Correlation Coefficient .723
**
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 20 20 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
The correlation between Board of Directors  and Corporate Governance shows .723 with each other at 
a significant level of .01. Hence this shows it has a “very (.60-.79) strong” correlation between the two variables 
as result this alternative hypothesis should be accepted and null hypothesis is rejected.  
 
Table 15: Spearman’s Rho of Management and Corporate Governance 
   Management Corporate Governance 
Spearman's rho Management Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .700
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .001 
N 20 20 
Corporate Governance Correlation Coefficient .700
**
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 . 
N 20 20 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
The correlation between Management  and Corporate Governance shows .700 with each other at a 
significant level of .01. Hence this shows it has a “very (.60-.79) strong” correlation between the two variables as 
result this alternative hypothesis should be accepted and null hypothesis is rejected.  
 
Table 16: Spearman’s Rho of Equity Ownership and Corporate Governance  
   Equity Ownership Corporate Governance 
Spearman's rho Equity Ownership Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .662
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .001 
N 20 20 
Corporate Governance Correlation Coefficient .662
**
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 . 
N 20 20 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
The correlation between Equity Ownership and Corporate Governance shows .622 with each other at a 
significant level of .01. Hence this shows it has a “very (.60-.79) strong” correlation between the two variables as 
result this alternative hypothesis should be accepted and null hypothesis is rejected.  
 
11.3 Regression Analysis 
Where the R2values represent how much a dependent variable is explained by the independent variable. 
Table 16: Model Summary of Regression between Independent and Dependent Variables 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .868
a
 .753 .739 .40914 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Board Composition, Board of Directors, Management, Equity Ownership 
R2 shows that 75.3% of this Independent variable (Board Composition, Board of Directors, 
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Management, Equity Ownership) explains Corporate Governance (dependent variable). 
 
12. Conclusion 
Corporate governance is not just a single structure but consists of Board composition, board of directors, 
management also equity ownership and individually those are relies on certain duties, obligations, and rights that 
control directly and indirectly a corporation's governance mechanism. The point of this governance mechanism 
is to properly operate the policy and deliver directions to the managers, stakeholders, creditors, regulators. In 
addition to informing these people of their responsibilities, the corporate governance should also ensure people 
about their rights within the company and obviously concern about the EPS besides the firm value also.To 
properly understand and utilize corporate governance it is important to understand and follow its most important 
principles. These principles help establish the roles and responsibilities of the key members of the corporation. 
The general principles of all forms of corporate governance are generally related to the shareholders, board 
members, and stakeholders. In addition to this, corporate governance also places a strong emphasis on the 
behavior of the corporation and how much the corporation discloses to the public. We have  surveyed on 
different types of organizations employees to come out with most efficient solution with high reliable and valid 
information by the interviewee to generate most coefficient and effective systems for the corporate governance 
mechanism and It is likely that an evolution toward stronger legal protection for investors in many countries 
would lead to improved corporate governance systems and greater economic development.We hope our research 
on corporate governance conducted the possible impact of differing legal systems on the structure and 
effectiveness of corporate governance and compares systems across countries. 
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